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The empirical evidence on 
the determinants of fiscal 
decentralization1
Abstract
This paper analyzes the main determinants of fiscal 
decentralization in a sample of eighty-four countries. The 
empirical findings show that the most consistent variable 
affecting fiscal decentralization is the size of a country: as 
land size increases, the level of fiscal decentralization in-
creases as well. Countries with higher income equality, an 
educated population, more democratic, more urbanized and 
open to trade are also more likely to be more decentralized, 
though the findings demonstrate that there are regional and 
income variations. The most important policy implication 
is that governments interested in deepening the devolution 
of fiscal responsibilities to sub-national levels may consider 
acting to affect those variables that have been shown to exert 
a positive influence on this process.
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La evidencia empírica sobre las 
determinantes de la descentralización fiscal 
Resumen
Este artículo analiza las principales determinantes de 
descentralización fiscal en una muestra de 84 países. Los 
resultados empíricos demuestran que el tamaño geográfico 
de un país es la variable que con mayor consistencia afecta 
el nivel de descentralización fiscal. Países con mayor equidad 
en la distribución del ingreso, con niveles de educación altos, 
más democráticos, más urbanizados y abiertos al comercio 
internacional tienden a ser más descentralizados, aunque los 
resultados demuestran que existen variaciones en el patrón de 
comportamiento a nivel regional y de ingreso. La implicación 
de política más importante es que aquellos países interesados en 
descentralizar funciones gubernamentales deberían considerar 
actuar sobre aquellas variables que han demostrado tener una 
influencia positiva sobre este proceso. 




Over the last three decades, there has been a significant global movement toward 
decentralization: institutional, political, and fiscal. The movement is by no means 
homogeneous, but usually involves substantial changes to institutional structures, 
including attempts to modify the country’s constitution, the introduction of elections 
at regional levels to encourage local democratization and, from a fiscal perspective, 
the devolution of greater responsibilities regarding revenue and expenditure admi-
nistration to sub-national levels of government. 
With respect to fiscal decentralization, countries differ significantly in the 
institutional arrangements of this process, as some move to strengthen decentra-
lization structures without regard to external considerations, while others adjust 
their decentralization processes in line with those of other countries with whom 
they have established economic and monetary arrangements. A good example of 
countries working to harmonize their fiscal arrangement structures are the Member 
States of the European Union. Another category includes those countries whose 
fiscal decentralization processes have regressed, e.g., Bolivia and Argentina, in part 
as a result of government emphasis on central planning and a tighter control of the 
fiscal purse. This article attempts to identify the different, cross-regional patterns 
of fiscal decentralization.
The principal objective of this paper is to explain differences between countries 
regarding the determinants of fiscal decentralization. Though previous attempts have 
been made in exploring this issue, this paper adds to the current literature on fiscal 
decentralization in several important ways. First, it uses a large dataset covering 
a thirty-five-year period (1980-2015), and a sample of 84 countries with differing 
levels of development. Second, it attempts to identify the reasons for decentralization 
using the most important variables included in relevant literature and other variables 
that have not been used before, such as income inequality, level of administrative 
fragmentation, and human development. Third, it includes a regional analysis of 
decentralization: Americas, Asia, Europe, and OECD countries, to determine whether 
significant regional patterns of decentralization exist. Finally, it introduces a simple, 
but novel approach to address the issue of endogeneity, a common problem in studies 
concerning fiscal decentralization.
The article’s main findings are that the size of a country, as measured 
by geographical land size, is the most consistent variable affecting the level of 
fiscal decentralization. Better distribution of income, an educated population, 
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mature democratic structures, higher urbanization, and greater openness to trade 
are also positively correlated with greater fiscal decentralization.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the literature 
in section 2, section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results, and section 5 provides some conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Existing literature on the role of subnational (regional or local) governments is vast, 
and includes seminal works on the optimal division of powers between central and 
subnational governments (Musgrave 1959, 1969); the positive welfare effects of 
interjurisdictional competition (Tiebout, 1956); the meaning and measurement of 
decentralization (Rodden, 2004); assessments of how the decentralization of gover-
nment functions influences the size of countries in equilibrium (Alesina & Spolaore, 
2003); and Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem, which states that in the absence 
of spillovers, a decentralized system is preferred because decisions made ‘closer to 
people’ allow for a better fit of local preferences. Later, Oates (1999, 2007) expands on 
his earlier work by analyzing the welfare gains of fiscal decentralization, the utiliza-
tion of fiscal instruments, and the process of fiscal decentralization in developing and 
transitional economies. He also questions whether fiscal decentralization is always 
the preferred option of government, through an analysis of destructive forces that 
can undermine the economic performance of a relatively decentralized public sector. 
More recent contributions on the performance of decentralized governments 
include those of Fedelino & Smoke (2013), which examines the connection between 
public financial management and decentralization and finds such a connection to be 
rare, which creates inconsistencies in government systems and sends mixed signals 
to key actors. Faguet (2014), considers how decentralization affects governance, 
political competition, public accountability, and political instability, while Gadenne 
& Singhal (2014) analyze the trade-offs associated with fiscal federalism in develo-
ping countries as well as the reasons for their low levels of decentralization. Faguet 
& Pöschl (2015) and Grazzi & Jaramillo (2015), offer insights and lessons about 
when decentralization may contribute to development in emerging economies and 
highlight institutional incentives that may improve public sector performance and 
strengthen economies in a way that enhance citizen well-being. Smoke (2015) com-
pares the expectations of decentralization with what it has actually achieved and 
Antonio Nicolás Bojanic
275
identifies factors that support or hinder decentralization. Finally, Channa & Faguet 
(2016) study the impact of decentralization on preference matching and technical 
efficiency in the provision of health and education in developing countries.
While the role of subnational governments has been thoroughly analyzed, why 
fiscal decentralization happens in the first place has received less attention. Some 
notable theoretical contributions on this topic include Panizza (1999), who develops 
a model for a country with a particular geographical area, population, divided into 
jurisdictions, and with two levels of government. His principal hypothesis, which 
his empirical analysis confirms, is that as levels fiscal centralization decrease, so do 
levels of taste and differentiation, the quality of democracy, income per capita, and 
country size. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) present a model of ‘separation’ or ‘inter-
nal exit.’ Their model is based on a country with two regions: the coastal region and 
the hinterland, and a unitary government located in the coastal region that provides 
local public goods to both regions. In a scenario of imperfect population mobility, the 
authors find a number of variables that promote separation, or adoption of formal 
federal structures, including income growth, population growth, higher spatial decay 
of local public services provided to the hinterland by the central government, rela-
tive income growth in the hinterland region, and lower costs of government for the 
hinterland region. Jametti and Joanis (2010) utilize a theoretical political economy 
framework, thus explicitly introducing the effects of political choices on the degree 
of decentralization. In a model in which a public good valued by voters in a given 
jurisdiction is jointly provided by two levels of government – labeled ‘federal’ and 
‘provincial’ – the degree of decentralization is dependent on the relative political 
conditions prevailing at each level of government. Finally, building on the works of 
Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi & Henderson (2005), Canavire-Bacarreza, et al., (2017) 
develop a model that explicitly include geographical fragmentation in the decentra-
lization framework. The principal hypothesis of their exercise is that higher levels 
of geographical complexity and ethnic diversity are associated with higher relative 
gains from transitioning to a decentralized system of public good provision.
Other studies that use different angles to understand fiscal decentralization 
include those by Letelier (2005) and Treisman (2006), which test various decentra-
lization hypotheses; Cai & Treisman (2006), which analyzes the role of decentraliza-
tion in China’s growth in recent decades; and those by Stegarescu (2009), Bodman 
& Hodge (2010), and Jílek & Milan (2015), which analyze fiscal decentralization in 
OECD countries.
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This paper bridges some of the gaps in the literature summarized above, as 
it focuses on the determinants of fiscal decentralization in different regions of the 
world. It utilizes the latest decentralization data and the same set of control varia-
bles for each subset of countries to determine whether there are any significant 
regional patterns in the fiscal decentralization process. Additionally, it incorporates 
previously unutilized control variables to ascertain how a number of development 
and institutional factors impact the process of fiscal decentralization.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
An important challenge in all cross-country studies concerning fiscal decentralization 
is the selection of an appropriate indicator of fiscal decentralization. The challenge 
arises from several angles, including how to properly measure the extent of decen-
tralization in various layers of government, and the significant feat of understanding 
each country’s tax system. This requires knowledge of the extent and nature of grant 
and transfer programs between the central and sub-regional governments, the struc-
ture of revenue-sharing mechanisms among regions, and the true level of political 
autonomy of regions. Here, the article follows the standard practice in the literature, 
which is to use the ratio of sub-national government revenues to general government 
revenues (revenue decentralization), and the ratio of sub-national government ex-
penditures to general government expenditures (expenditure decentralization) as 
proxies for fiscal decentralization,1 both expressed as a percentage.2 The principal 
source of information for both fiscal decentralization indicators is the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government Finance Statistics Annual Yearbook (GFS).3 
When possible, data was also obtained from Ministries of Finance responsible for 
collecting government data,4 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).5 As these are the primary sources of decentralization data 
1 Though there are many limitations with these standard measurements, including their inability to properly 
measure the level of autonomy of subnational governments; the lack of identification in the sources of tax and 
non-tax revenues and the lack of a distinction between locally determined own taxes, piggybacked taxes, or 
shared taxes; and their failure to disclose what proportion of intergovernmental transfers is conditional, hence 
ignoring the degree of central government control over local tax rates and tax bases, these standard measures 
are chosen to ensure the number of countries included in the analysis is as large as possible.
2 Revenues (expenditures) at regional, state, and local levels are added to obtain the measures of sub-national 
government revenues (expenditures).
3 data.imf.org/?sk=E86E9088-3830-4CA3-B240-1B0EC5E15221 
4 Data for Argentina were obtained from the Federal Tax Commission (www.cfi.gov.ar) and the Treasury and 
Ministry of Finance (www.economia.gob.ar).
5  www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism/fiscal-decentralisation-database.htm 
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for this study, it is important to note the limitations of this data; they do not include 
information on the nature of government transfers or what level of government 
controls transfer and grants.
Eighty-four countries are included in the analysis. Of these, eleven are African 
countries, fourteen are from America,6 nineteen from Asia,7 thirty-seven from Europe, 
and three from Oceania. Additionally, thirty-five of these countries are part of the 
OECD, a group that comprises some of the wealthiest countries in the world. Yearly 
observations range from 1980 to 2015, though the dates of available data for all 
countries do not necessarily coincide. Conditional on: (i) the specific methodology 
utilized in estimating a regression; (ii) whether the full sample of countries or only 
countries from a particular region or group are being considered; (iii) the regres-
sors being utilized; and (iv) the dependent variable of the model – either revenue 
decentralization or expenditure decentralization – the number of observations in all 
specifications varies from a 102 to 1,159. Considering all countries, the data consists 
of an unbalanced panel with the number of observations ranging from 736 to 1,159.8
Consistent with previous studies, control variables utilized in the base speci-
fications are the land area; GDP per capita (measured at purchasing power parity); 
an index of democracy (0 = poor democracy; 10 = highest democracy), to account for 
the ways in which a representative democracy affects devolving fiscal responsibilities 
to lower levels of government);9 the share of total trade on GDP ((exports+imports)/
GDP), to measure the impact of openness; the share of urban population (% of total);10 
and the Gini index (0 = perfect equality; 100 = perfect inequality), to consider how 
the level of inequality affects fiscal decentralization.11 Additional control variables 
added to the base specifications include a fragmentation index, to measure the 
6 Countries from America include those in North, Central, South America and the Caribbean.
7 Countries from Asia include those in the continental landmass known as Eurasia.
8 The appendix reports summary statistics and the specific time periods of available decentralization data for 
each of the countries included in the study. The unbalanced panel for America includes data for fourteen 
countries, and the number of observations varies between 151-230. For Asia, there are nineteen countries, 
whose number of observations range from 102 to 137. For Europe, the unbalanced panel consists of thirty-seven 
countries with 450 to 751 numbers of observations. Finally, the study includes thirty-five OECD countries 
with the number of observations ranging between 414 and 770. Though there are significant gaps in all data 
sets, the researchers opted to let the existing data speak for itself, and thus, the paper does not use averages or 
linear approximations to fill gaps in the data. Due the limited amount of observations, results for Africa and 
Oceania are not reported, though they are available upon request.
9 Source: Polity IV Project: Center for Systemic Peace: www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
10 Source for land area, the share of total trade on GDP, and urban population is The World Bank, World Deve-
lopment Indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/. 
11 Source: The World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/all-the-ginis. 
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impact of regional divisions from the central government;12 general government 
debt (percentage of GDP), to account for the level of indebtedness; the inflation rate 
(percentage) to account for macroeconomic stability; the unemployment rate (per-
centage), to measure the impact of labor markets;13 and the Human Development 
Index (HDI) (0 = lower development; 1 = higher development), to account for how 
key dimensions of human development affect fiscal decentralization.14
Based on previous research on the determinants of fiscal decentralization 





it it itY Z2 0
0
1 2∆           [1] 
where ∆ = δ ⦁ 100 is the two-period lead measure of fiscal decentralization 
(revenue- or expenditure-based), in percentages; Y represents conventional variables 
in the base specification; Z represents additional control variables, and; ε is a stan-
dard error term. The two-period lead feature of the dependent variable is utilized 
to avoid endogeneity problems: the value of explanatory variables in time t cannot 
be affected by the value of the dependent variable two years into the future.15
Equation (1) was estimated with random effects because even if there are 
omitted variables, it is unlikely that they will have time-invariant values and time-
invariant effects on the dependent variable.16 Three additional reasons for utilizing 
random effects are (i) they allow to estimate the effects of time-invariant variables, 
12 Source: Polity IV Project: Center for Systemic Peace: www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. The index can 
take on four possible values: 0 = no overt fragmentation; 1 = slight fragmentation, whereby less than 10% 
of the country’s territory is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the central authority 
of the regime; 2 = moderate fragmentation, whereby 10 to 25 percent of the country’s territory is under local 
authority and actively separated from the central authority; and 3 = serious fragmentation, whereby more 
than 25% (and up to 50%) of the country is effectively under local authority and actively separated from the 
central authority of the country. 
13 Source for GDP per capita, general government debt, the inflation rate, and the unemployment rate is the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF): https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx. 
14 Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports. Available at: http://hdr.
undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement 
in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and a decent standard 
of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the dimensions.
15 Other leads were used and the results were generally consistent with the ones reported here. The two-lead 
feature was chosen because it seemed rational to assume two years was long enough to ensure regressors today 
would be unaffected by the dependent variable two years into the future, hence ensuring endogeneity is not a 
problem – i.e., fiscal decentralization and the regressors in specification (1) are not jointly determined.
16 Fixed-effects specifications were also estimated and the results were very similar and consistent with those 
reported here.
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like land area; (ii) this is the most common approach used in other studies on fiscal 
decentralization, including, for instance, Arzaghi & Henderson (2005) and Jílek 
(2015), and; (iii) the Hausman test showed a random effects specification was the 
appropriate methodology.17 All specifications were estimated via Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS). Additionally, to correct for intra-sectional and cross-sectional autoco-
rrelation, all specifications were estimated with the Prais-Winsten Panel Corrected 
Standard Error (PCSE) procedure.
Given that the dependent variables are non-negative censored variables 
(cannot exceed 100 percent), equation (1) was also estimated with the use of a 
Tobit model. Finally, instrumental variables (two-stage GLS)18 and fixed effects GLS 
were used as additional robustness checks. Section 4 shows that regardless of the 
estimation technique, the results are consistently similar. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results are reported for different subsets of nations. Table 1 presents 
the principal determinants of both revenue and expenditure decentralization for the 
full sample of countries considering only the base specification.
The impact of the explanatory variables on both revenue and expenditure 
decentralization is consistent with theoretical expectations and findings from 
previous studies. The results indicate that geographically bigger countries, with 
higher per capita income, more open to trade, and with greater shares of urban 
population, are likely to be more fiscally decentralized, as evidenced by consistently 
positive and statistically significant coefficients for Land Area, Real GDP per Capita, 
Share of Total Trade on GDP, and Urban Population. The results also show that as 
countries achieve greater income equality, they will tend to be more decentralized, 
evidenced by consistently negative and statistically significant Gini Index coefficients. 
Finally, with decentralization on the expenditure side, the results seem to indicate 
that mature, representative democracies are also more conducive to greater fiscal 
decentralization.19
17 Given a p-value of 0.60, the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random effects cannot be rejected.
18 Instruments are one-lagged values of each explanatory variable.
19 The interpretation of results should be done with caution as the empirical analysis does not take into conside-
ration whether the countries analyzed here are constitutionally decentralized federations or unitary states with 
some fiscal decentralization. Controlling for whether a given country is formally fiscally decentralized would 
require a thorough understanding of each country’s fiscal arrangements since 1980, and this is a formidable 
task even for those countries for which information is available. 
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An important aspect of the results reported in Table 1 is that they are quite 
consistent regardless of whether the base specification is estimated with random 
or fixed effects, with the contemporaneous value of the dependent variable, or with 
the one-period lead (GLS(+1)) or the two-period lead (GLS(+2)), and irrespective of 
whether a Tobit model or instrumental variables are utilized. Based on these findings, 
from this point forward, the results reported here are for specifications using the 
two-period lead and estimated with random effects; and the results for specifications 
using contemporaneous dependent variables and estimated with the Tobit model. 
Table 2 reports estimation results for the full sample of countries when the 
dependent variable is revenue decentralization and with additional explanatory 
variables added to the base specification.
The results are consistent with those found for the base specification: geogra-
phically large, urbanized, economically growing countries, with mature democracies, 
open to the outside world, and with significant income equality, are more likely to be 
decentralized on the revenue side. Concerning the additional variables added to the 
base specification, the results show that as countries become more fragmented, the 
incentives for greater revenue decentralization increase. This outcome makes sense, 
as the incentives for greater decentralization must be in part the result of differen-
ces, cultural, economic, social differences, between regions of a country, which may 
lead central governments to increase devolution of fiscal responsibilities to prevent 
further fragmentation of the country. The estimates also show that as unemployment 
decreases and human development improves, the level of revenue decentralization 
increases as well. It is reasonable to expect that a well-educated population, with a 
decent standard of living and low levels of unemployment is likely to demand greater 
responsibilities from the central government. On the other hand, government debt 
and macroeconomic stability – reflected in the inflation rate – do not seem to have 
any impact on revenue decentralization.
Table 3 reports the same set of regressions for the full set of countries but 
when the dependent variable is expenditure decentralization.
The estimate results mirror those obtained when the dependent variable 
is revenue decentralization. One important difference is that decentralization on 
the expenditure side seems to be negatively affected by the level of government 
debt: as the ratio of government debt to GDP increases, the level of expenditure 
decentralization decreases – reflected in negative and statistically significant (Tobit 
estimate) coefficients for this variable. This highlights the importance of the size 
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of government debt on the extent of expenditure decentralization. By contrast, the 
level of fragmentation does not seem to exert any statistically significant impact on 
the dependent variable.
The same set of specifications are now reported for specific sub-groups of 
countries. Table 4 shows the determinants of revenue decentralization for countries 
in the Americas.
The results demonstrate that as land area and income equality increase, reve-
nue decentralization tends to intensify, in line with the results of the full sample of 
countries. However, unlike what was found with the full set of countries, economic 
growth does not seem to enhance decentralization, nor does better democracy, 
more open markets, or higher levels of urbanization. With respect to the additional 
variables added to the base specification, the results indicate that higher fragmenta-
tion, government debt, and unemployment rates, as well as lower inflation promote 
greater revenue decentralization. Surprisingly, higher human development is not 
correlated with decentralization. Thus, with the exception of country size and income 
inequality, the reasons for revenue decentralization in the Americas are markedly 
different from those observed in the full sample of countries.
Table 5 presents the determinants for expenditure decentralization in America.
Consistent with findings for revenue decentralization, expenditure decentra-
lization also increases as the size of a country increases, democracy deteriorates, 
income inequality abates, government debt increases, and unemployment worsens. 
However, the results also indicate more open trade and higher levels of urbanization 
are conducive to expenditure decentralization, and highlight that different variables 
exert different effects on the type of fiscal decentralization countries experience. 
Furthermore, economic growth, the level of fragmentation, macroeconomic stability, 
and human development do not seem to have any statistically significant impact on 
the dependent variable.
The findings for the Asia region are first reported in table 6, where the deter-
minants for revenue decentralization are analyzed.
The results indicate a positive correlation between the size of Asian countries 
and the level of revenue decentralization, consistent with results for the Americas 
and the full set of countries. There is also some indication that as democracy worsens, 
countries become less open to trade, and as they become less urbanized, the level 
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levels of human development are also correlated with greater levels of revenue 
decentralization. Last, income inequality, fragmentation level, government debt, 
economic growth, and the inflation rate do not have a statistically significant impact 
on the decentralization. 
Regarding expenditure decentralization, table 7 reports the findings for this 
region of the world.
The geographical size of a country, once again, has a positive impact on ex-
penditure decentralization, as do greater income equality and human development. 
There is some indication that more mature, developed democracies exert a positive 
influence on the dependent variable, but the findings are not statistically consis-
tent across all specifications. Higher government debt and more open economies 
lead to lower levels of expenditure decentralization, but the level of fragmentation, 
macroeconomic stability and the state of labor markets do not seem to have any 
significant impact on decentralization. Finally, the impact of economic growth and 
urbanization are unclear.
Table 8 reports the determinants of revenue decentralization in Europe.
Replicating previous findings, the size of a country exerts a positive influence 
on revenue decentralization. Additionally, the results suggest that more developed 
democracies that are open to international trade, are highly urbanized, with low 
levels of income inequality and shrinking public debt, with an educated populace, 
and with low levels of unemployment, are also more likely to experience greater 
revenue decentralization. The impact of economic growth is indeterminate, and 
macroeconomic stability and the level of fragmentation do not seem to have any 
statistical impact on the dependent variable.
With respect to expenditure decentralization, table 9 reports the findings for 
the European continent.
The impact of all variables on the dependent variable mirrors how they affect 
revenue decentralization, highlighting that revenue or expenditure fiscal decentra-
lization in Europe is consistently the result of similar forces, unlike in other regions 
of the world.
A final sub-group of countries includes Member States of the Organization for 
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wealthiest countries in the world. Table 10 reports on the determinants of revenue 
decentralization for this group of countries.
Not surprisingly, the results are similar to those found for the European con-
tinent, with some important differences. Again, geographically bigger countries, 
with more developed democracies, open to international trade, urban, low income 
inequality, unemployment and growth, and high human development, are more 
likely to enjoy greater levels of revenue decentralization, consistent with the results 
for Europe. However, in OECD countries, lower levels of fragmentation and greater 
macroeconomic stability, reflected in lower inflation, are also conducive to greater 
revenue decentralization, underlining perhaps the heterogeneity of nations grouped 
under the OECD umbrella. 
  Regarding the determinants of expenditure decentralization in OECD cou-
ntries – shown in Table 11 – the results are similar to the ones found for revenue 
decentralization, with some key differences.
Again, land area, the share of total trade on GDP, urban population, income in-
equality, level of fragmentation, inflation rate, unemployment rate, and the human de-
velopment index all have similar impacts on expenditure decentralization. However, 
there is a strong statistical indication that the level of democracy is not as important 
for expenditure decentralization as for revenue decentralization. Furthermore, unlike 
the results obtained with revenue decentralization, government debt, specifically, 
low levels of public debt, are positively correlated with expenditure decentralization.
Table 12 summarizes the most relevant findings for each of the groups analy-
zed here.
As the table shows, the determinants of fiscal decentralization vary signifi-
cantly across groups. Only one variable is consistently correlated with both fiscal 
decentralization indicators across all groups: country size. Additionally, higher 
human development rating is correlated with higher levels of decentralization in 
all groups except the Americas, where the relationship is unclear. Similarly, low in-
come inequality is also positively correlated with both decentralization indicators 
in all regions except Asia, where the relationship between low inequality and fiscal 
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the empirical determinants of fiscal decentralization in a sample 
of eighty-four countries and subsets of countries according to geographical regions 
and level of wealth. The main findings are as follows: the land area of countries is 
always an important determinant of fiscal decentralization, irrespective of the cou-
ntry group under analysis. Additionally, high levels of human development seem to 
be an important driver of decentralization, although this relationship is not as clear 
in the Americas. Higher real GDP per capita levels are also conducive for greater 
levels of fiscal decentralization in the full sample of countries, but its impact varies 
between country groups. Likewise, mature and developed democracies seem to faci-
litate expenditure and revenue decentralization in Europe and OECD countries and 
expenditure decentralization in Asia. Greater openness to trade and higher levels of 
urbanization also promote both expenditure and revenue decentralization in Europe 
and in OECD countries, and expenditure decentralization in America. High levels of 
income equality seem to be conducive for greater decentralization in all groups but 
Asia, where the effect on revenue decentralization is unclear. High fragmentation 
is an important determinant of decentralization in the full sample of countries and 
the Americas specifically, but in other groups the impact of this variable is less clear. 
Finally, higher levels of government debt and unemployment affect decentralization 
more in the Americas than in other regions, and the impact of the inflation rate is, 
for the most part, indeterminate.
The most important policy implication is the importance of the general context 
of fiscal decentralization, and certain variables will exert different effects on this 
process depending on the stage of development of the country in question. For the 
most part, bigger, urbanized countries, with more equitable income distribution, 
high levels of human capital formation, open to the outside world, are more likely 
to exhibit greater fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is rarely a goal in 
itself; rather, decentralization is used as a tool to achieve a more efficient distribution 
of public funds or a fairer distribution of national income. Thus, if devolving fiscal 
responsibilities to lower levels of government is a government objective, countries 
should act to affect those variables that will increase the likelihood of establishing 
an effective fiscal decentralization regime: strengthen democracy and democratic 
institutions, improve education quality, refine income redistribution policies, and 
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